Introduction
Relationships between citizenship and national identity are becoming increasingly complex as migrants and those in diaspora have multiple attachments, feelings of belonging and political loyalties. The notion of the decoupling of citizenship and identity (Isin and Wood, 1999 ) may help to describe such changes and forms part of ongoing reconceptualisations of citizenship in host societies. In particular, for migrants and those in diaspora, there may be a decoupling of citizenship and national identity whereby they obtain citizenship in the host country but continue to feel attached to their homeland.
Such a de-territorialisation of the nation across state boundaries has triggered notions such as 'instrumental citizenship' and 'flexible citizens' (Ip et al 1997; Waters, 2003; Ong, 1999) . Drawing on such ideas, this paper puts forward the notion of pragmatic citizenship 1 as a way to highlight the strategic element of migrant/diasporic citizenship acquisition that enables and allows for multiple feelings of belonging that are positioned at particular times/spaces for particular reasons. In the process, although it is inclusive, it does not deny people the right to belong and form strong attachments to place(s), particularly the homeland, which for those in diaspora can continue to be important.
Pragmatic citizenship forms part of the ongoing re-conceptualisation of citizenship in an attempt to make it more inclusive and relevant for migrants and those in diaspora who may have complex and ambiguous legal status, feelings of belonging and 1 I am grateful to Cheryl McEwan for suggesting this term.
relations to the state. At the same time, because it involves the acquisition of Westernstate citizenship it may be seen as a strategic form of citizenship that arises out of necessity, particularly for those who are stateless. Although there may be increasing cross-border connections that transgress state-controlled boundaries, such boundaries continue to exist. Those without formal citizenship status can feel marginalised and trapped. As a result, they may attach great importance to the acquisition of Western state citizenship. This paper examines such pragmatic citizenship and its relationships to national identity in relation to the Palestinian diaspora in Athens and their desire to attain
Greek citizenship without letting go of their politicised belonging to Palestine and wish for self-determination and a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In relation to this, Stein and Swedenburg (2004: 11) have argued that: "the present-day (and past) conflict between Palestine and Israel illustrates the ongoing violence associated with the enduring exclusivist ideologies of the national".
Exclusionary notions of national identity and its relationship to citizenship within new states created as a result of self-determination may have significant implications for future citizenship laws, official membership of and inclusion within such newly formed states. As the notion of pragmatic citizenship does not necessarily demand full belonging to the host country, it can encourage strong feelings of belonging to the homeland and potentially lead to the normalising and accentuating of relationships between citizenship and national identity in a future state and/or homeland. However, as this paper will illustrate such perceptions do not have to be exclusive or problematic.
This paper is based on in -depth qualitative research carried out in 2003-2004, in which 54 Palestinians were interviewed informally using key gatekeepers who were accessed using the Palestinian Representation in Greece, the Parikia (or Palestinian community house) and snowballing techniques. These interviews were loosely structured around key themes but were open-ended enough for respondents to discuss issues they felt were important. If permission was given, interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed. A system of coding around the key themes of home/belonging/national identity, politicisation/political activities, diasporic spaces and citizenship was then employed. Although the process of speaking to a wide cross-section of Palestinians in diaspora in Athens led to a variety of responses and opinions, this was seen in positive terms and highlighted the diversity of Palestinian experience in Athens. At the same time,
it also allowed the exploration of difference as well as similarity.
The authors own positionality as non-Palestinian and non-Arab (and non-Arab speaking) was also important, as was the fact that research was being conducted for a British University; this had varying implications. On the one hand, some respondents felt honoured and happy that research was being conducted on what they thought and that their voices could be heard; on the other, some were suspicious and this resulted in the researcher having to justify and explain the research rationale and motives at length.
Therefore, issues of trust were important; the nine month length of this project reflected the need to build up trust, acceptance and support over time. Not being able to speak to respondents in Arabic was also seen as a limitation; respondents were interviewed in either Greek or English, whichever they felt most comfortable and fluent in. However, this did not limit the choice of interviewee as on no occasion were participants excluded because of language. The main issue was the fact that they would have felt more at ease had Arabic been spoken and the nuances of certain notions might have been easier to discuss and articulate. The choice of interviewees for inclusion in this paper reflects their particular interests in and viewpoints on the relationships between citizenship and national identity; however, in the research itself, Palestinians from a wide range of backgrounds and with varying opinions were spoken to.
After a discussion on theoretical perspectives on citizenship and national identity as well as an outline of Palestinian legal status and perceptions of injustices in Greece, the paper focuses on the acquisition of pragmatic non-Palestinian citizenship and illustrates how many Palestinians remain emotionally attached to Palestine. The final part of this paper is perhaps the most important as it discusses the viewpoints of Palestinians in Athens with inclusive views on national identity and future statehood for Jews and Arabs in historical Palestine.
Deconstructing citizenship and national identity
Citizenship is a contested and complicated notion (Faulks, 2000) . It can be seen as a set of practices and processes that allow individuals to construct, negotiate and position themselves spatially and temporally for strategic and legitimising purposes. There are a "staggering array of different policies and arrangements that further complicate any understanding of what precisely citizenship is" (Croucher 2004: 45) . For example, Davis (1997: 3) has defined citizenship in western liberal democratic states in terms of the equal (civil, power-political, social service and material) resource rights afforded to citizens. Faist (2000: 202) has stressed that citizenship forms "a series of reciprocal transactions between a citizen and the state", highlighting that citizenship is a two way process, where a citizen has duties as well as rights. However, duties should not necessarily depend on exclusive notions of identity. A decoupling of citizenship and identity (Isin and Wood 1999) does not necessarily mean that such rights and duties are ignored or are less important but highlights that citizenship needs to be less exclusive. At the same time, for migrants and those in diaspora, who want to obtain pragmatic citizenship, notions of jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship, where the former refers to membership rooted in soil and the latter to membership rooted in blood (Croucher, 2004) influences how easy it is for them to be granted this citizenship. For the latter (as is the case in Greece), in particular, relationships between national identity and citizenship may be seen as exclusive as states may expect their citizens to belong exclusively to the nation-state.
Relationships between national identity and citizenship can be summarised as follows: "who gets defined as a 'true' citizen within the city-state or nation-state depends in part on who carries with them what is deemed to be the correct baggage of history, ethnicity, language and religion" (Painter and Philo, 1995: 112) . Citizenship envisioned in such simpler or more traditional ways encourage definitions and validations based on official belonging to a country, which is linked to national identity. This can explain why people who have an ambiguous relationship with the 'nation-state' or who are not 'nationals', a concept that Castles and Davidson (2000: 84) call an "intrinsically particularistic and exclusionary category", can be excluded or discriminated against.
In simplistic terms, it is often assumed that the people within a nation-state constitute a nation, and possess feelings of national identity and nationalism. According to Smith (1999: 37) , nationalism is:
an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'. By a 'nation', I mean a named human population sharing a historical territory, common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members.
The assumption that there is a naturalised and potentially exclusive relationship between territory, national identity and citizenship, whereby national identity is neatly located in a clearly demarcated and bounded nation-state can be seen as problematic. In relation to this, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 302) have noted that what they call 'methodological nationalism' is "the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world". It is such assumptions, they argue, that have deeply influenced academic theories within the social sciences and that also may explain why "the lack of a temporal and spatial fit between state and nation is one of the main causes of many of today's national conflicts" (Smith, 1999: 38) . Despite the relevance of the homeland for diasporic and migrant populations, the fact that there are thousands of perceived homelands located in less than 200 nation-states could be seen as problematic if self-determination is seen as a right. According to Davis (1997: 24) , the idea of a nation-state and self-determination has been given international legal legitimisation with the proclamation of the Although Palestinians in diaspora may still feel attached to a Palestinian homeland, the fact that many are acquiring pragmatic citizenship elsewhere and, therefore, may have multiple feelings of belonging, raises questions for their relationship with a future Palestinian state, especially if they want to return. This forms part of the wider debates around the de/re-territorialisation of the nation and the ability and need for migrants and those in diaspora to remain rooted and belong to their homelands and countries of origin even as they may acquire pragmatic citizenship elsewhere.
Such imagined communities (Anderson, 1983) have been seen as an important aspect of national identity and nationalism. As a result, a strong symbolic attachment to one another and a territorialised state or homeland must be imagined in order to create a shared sense of belonging and sustain a nation-state, which can no longer be maintained by traditional face-to-face contact and which may also extend across borders, in the form of long-distance nationalism (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001; Skrbis, 1999) , for example. Nationalism can also potentially (and unsurprisingly) lead, therefore, to what Gilroy (1999) has called 'ethnic absolutism' or extreme forms of nationalism that can be seen behind tragic processes such as ethnic cleansing and some homeland-orientated politics (Carter, 2005) . As this paper will show, however, self-determination and the need for strong feelings of belonging to a nation and/or state do not have to be exclusive and can be based around more inclusive notions of belonging and citizenship.
Pragmatic citizenship
The acquisition of pragmatic citizenship forms part ongoing re-conceptualisations of citizenship. Citizenship is being critically reappraised in order to make it relevant to the needs of and more inclusive for people today, such as women (McEwan, 2000) and migrants (Croucher, 2004; Benhabib, 2004) who are being potentially excluded or marginalised. This may be particularly the case for migrants and those in diaspora who are stateless or whose citizenship status is ambiguous and/or decoupled from the national identity of the host country in which they reside. The decoupling of citizenship and national identity illustrates that they may have voluntary multiple attachments and affiliations, which may stretch beyond the borders of the state in which they are currently citizens. As Nagel and Staeheli (2004: 6, citing Mandaville 1999) note: "immigrant groups (or diasporas and transmigrants) are said to exist in a new global market of political loyalties, engaging in a complex politics of 'here and there' and resisting attempts by the state to "fix parameters of political community and territory" and to assimilate newcomers into a national's culture".
As Nagel and Staeheli (2004: 4) also argue: "it is possible to claim identity as a citizen of a country and to negotiate membership within the bounds of 'belonging', even without claiming to 'be of' that country", thus breaking the assumed congruity between citizenship, state and nation. In relation to this, Soysal (1998: 210, 209) has argued that "the idea of nation becomes insignificant, a mere trope of convenience for claims to collective rights and identity". For Soysal, post-national membership is a more relevant notion, whereby "an identity politics energised by narratives of collective pasts and accentuated cultural differences, becomes the basis for participation and affords the means for mobilising resources in the national and world polities". In a similar vein, Tambini (2001: 212) feels that 'post-national citizenship' is becoming more important as "the meaning and content of national belonging will be transformed as the structural basis of national citizenship continues to be undermined". Such notions have important implications for the practices and processes of citizenship within and beyond states, as they may be able to make citizenship more relevant and inclusive for migrants and those in diaspora with complex and ambiguous relations to the state. At the same time, however, feelings of national belonging to the de/re territorialised nation and/or homeland continue to be important for many in diaspora and this cannot be ignored.
This paper adds to such debates on citizenship and its relationships to national identity by putting forward the concept of pragmatic citizenship, or citizenship that is sought, acquired and negotiated for pragmatic and strategic reasons and can result in dual or multiple feelings of belonging and attachment as well as de/re-territorialisation. It may be seen as similar to the notion of 'instrumental citizenship' discussed by Aguilar (1999) which denotes the fact that home states accept the fact that although their émigrés may have citizenship and formal belonging in another state, they still are emotionally attached to their homeland and make allowances for this. In this way, they are still treated as part of a nation that is spread out and de-territorialised. Such a notion of citizenship is also reminiscent of the work by Ong (1999) on flexible citizens, whereby there is the acquisition of multiple passports as a means of security as well as the work of Waters (2003) where Canadian citizenship and the 'spreading out' of families is also used strategically in the education of Chinese migrants. Such a focus on the importance and use of passports is central to notions of pragmatic citizenship, whereby the strategic acquisition of citizenship is equated with the acquisition of a passport for security, social and economic reasons, rather than strong or exclusive belonging to the host state.
This paper attempts to illustrate that such pragmatic citizenship can have varying repercussions in terms of perceptions of the relationships between citizenship and national identity because it may depend on where such perceptions are directed: the host state or the homeland. Pragmatic citizenship may encourage the decoupling of the relationships between citizenship and national identity in the host state, whereby migrants and those in diaspora do not possess strong feelings of belonging to that state. This may also lead to feelings of ambivalence, in-between-ness as well as the negotiation of dual or multiple attachments to place and territory. However, this can also lead to the coupling of the relationships between citizenship and national identity in the homeland or future state, particularly if the group in question involved in nation-state building. Pragmatic citizenship may take on special significance for such groups because it can be seen as a way to gain citizenship status and the rights and privileges this affords without the need to fully belong to the host state and without the need to 'let go' of attachments to the homeland. In turn, this may also fuel perceptions of the nature of citizenship and its relationships to national identity in the homeland and/or future state that are not necessarily exclusive.
Before an in-depth discussion of empirical evidence to explore such issues, it is necessary to examine the complexities of citizenship and legal status of Palestinians in
Greece. This, and the contextual background that follows, will help illustrate why the relationships between citizenship and national identity are important to these exilic and diasporic Palestinians as they engage in politicised discourses of nation-state building and self-determination that are often based on negative perceptions of statelessness and injustice.
Palestinian perceptions of injustice and legal status
According to the Palestinian representation in Greece, there are roughly 4000 Palestinians in Greece; most live in Athens, but they are also spread around Greece in cities such as Greece, see Shawa, 2005 ).
Many are not Greek citizens as Greek citizenship is granted on a jus sanguinis basis and is closely guarded (Rozakis, 1996) and is often difficult to obtain as a result (Fakiolas, 1999 The ability of Palestinians to enter and reside in Greece aptly illustrates the issues surrounding mobility, legal status and consequent feelings of insecurity and injustice.
Entering Greece students appears to have been a relatively easy for Palestinians. As Layla, explains: "Greece was the only country that would accept me…my parents were told at the time by friends that it was very easy to get a student visa to come to Greece, so we went to the Greek Embassy in Abu Dhabi where we were living at the time and they gave me a student visa for 3 months". The choice of Greece as a destination for
Palestinians students may be partly explained by the popular (and to a lesser extent, political) support the Palestinian cause has tended to receive in Greece (Smith, 2002 
money. What is this? Who has the right and the idea to do this? And nobody can claim that it [the land] is not ours…I can't imagine what will happen to me if they claim that I am not Palestinian. So what kind of compensation can they give to me and by whom?
Although he lives in Greece, Jamal's family moved to Egypt from Gaza and his testimony below illustrates the difficulties he has encountered as a result: forthcoming) or from having dual or multiple feelings of attachment.
I have Egyptian travel documents -they are the worst travel documents used by the Palestinians because actually we don't have the right to go back to Egypt and it causes us a lot of problems until now. I have been in Greece for

Palestinian acquisition of pragmatic citizenship
This research reveals that for Palestinians in Athens, pragmatic citizenship appears closely related to the holding of passports that enable travelling and afford more protection and security. As Lindholm Schulz (2003: 188) Ibrahim reiterates the fact that pragmatic citizenship can encourage feelings of dual attachment and belonging, whereby he feels it is acceptable to become a Greek citizen and belong there whilst still maintaining his feelings of being Palestinian which are very strong and which he does not want to let go of. Sa'id also usefully describes the acquisition of pragmatic citizenship in other Western countries: "Palestinians go to these countries, they say they're going to stay 3 years. If they have problems with the Israeli government, prosecution or anything, they know that when they leave that they cannot go back to see their family with the Palestinian passport they have. So then they ask for asylum and as soon as they get the citizenship they go back". Sa'id is referring to the general situation in Western countries, not Greece, as claiming asylum in Greece is an arduous process and few Palestinians have been granted it. He himself has Jordanian citizenship, but points out: "I'm not allowed to go. I have to get another citizenship in order to go." His personal strategy to overcome this is studying political science to become a diplomat, in which case he believes "the Israelis won't be able to touch" him.
Because access to Palestine/Israel is controlled by Israel, Palestinians need Western state citizenship before they are allowed to enter their homeland and this is something that they often find unfair.
Pragmatic citizenship can facilitate access to the homeland without the need to form exclusive or full attachments to either the host country or homeland. This is another reason why pragmatic citizenship in a Western state is seen as so important. It does not stop Palestinians from being passionately attached to Palestine as a territorialized homeland to belong to, whether they have been or lived there or not and whether they might want to return there to live or not. What is less clear is how Palestinians in diaspora will react of they are not automatically entitled to citizenship in a future state, or they are not given the right to return and therefore, may feel excluded. Jamal illustrates these issues well: Jamal does not feel that the acquisition of pragmatic citizenship is problematic because he will continue to feel Palestinian whether or not he is allowed to return to live there.
Likewise, Tariq, who is a Greek citizen, and has been living in Greece for over twenty years and is married to a Greek, believes his feelings of being Palestinian "will never The perceived need for a politicised Palestinian identity to help ensure that Palestinians achieve statehood is seen as paramount. This belief can be summarised as "the creation of a Palestinian land for Palestinian people, where they can be free and have all their rights" (Abbas) and "We are entitled to an independent Palestinian state. We are entitled to an identity" (Rafat). Such feelings of needing to hold onto a Palestinian identity are also triggered by insecure legal status and feelings of marginalisation and discrimination, as Faeq points out: "they [the Greek authorities] don't write that I am Palestinian, when I am. They don't have a Palestinian category; we don't exist". Among some respondents, this appears to have also led to a need to prove that they are
Palestinians as a defensive mechanism. Mahmud, for example, stresses that he is a "genuine Palestinian. I have a Palestinian identity card and passport" (italics added).
Lindholm Schulz (2003: 88) explains that: "the Palestinians are constantly faced with suspicion, harassment and exclusion because they cannot prove a national identity, a citizenship legally inscribed in their passports". However, she also claims that "the condition of being Palestinian…is to move" (ibid.: 87). Therefore, because they are in exile and stateless, they feel they have to acquire pragmatic citizenship which can lead to feelings of belonging in the host society. However, at the same time, because there is no
Palestinian state, such belonging can be ambivalent and be seen as problematic and is often accompanied by politicised feelings of 'Palestinian-ness'. For example, they may feel 'at home' in Greece, but feeling Palestinian and belonging to Palestine often comes first because of the current situation and unresolved conflict there. However, what is important about such attachments is that they are not necessarily exclusive of others, but are based around the need to belong to territory they see as rightfully and historically theirs, as the last section of this paper illustrates. Living in diaspora 'here' but belonging 'there' or 'here/there' has allowed some Palestinians in Greece to formulate visions of statehood and citizenship that are based on 'radical inclusiveness' 4 but without letting go of feelings of national identity and belonging that are constructed in non-exclusive terms.
Future statehood, citizenship and belonging
Despite the potentially exclusionary aspects surrounding nationalism and its relationship to citizenship and the state, the state appears to be a major factor in the governing and organising of contemporary society. Some have argued that the nation-state remains important (Triandafyllidou, 1998; Marden, 1997; Ong, 1999) , as it is perceived as the main way in which people can obtain rights. Therefore, it is unsurprising Palestinians cling onto statehood and self-determination as a way to deal with their current statelessness. However, although there is always the propensity for us/them relationships to occur in the process of state-building that arise out of extreme notions of national Ahmed's use of the word 'ghettoes' is interesting; he purposefully relates present Palestinian suffering, injustices and hardship that he feels Israelis are responsible for with the ghettoes Jews themselves suffered in. At the same time, however, his rationale in using such an argument is important, because it highlights the interconnected lives and fates of Jews and Palestinians within a highly contested, problematic piece of land that is emotionally and symbolically invested (Shapiro, 2000) .
The views of these Palestinians also help stress that "Palestinian and Israeli, Arab and Jew are not natural categories, but politically contingent categories that are forever shifting and changing in meaning and implications" (Kelly, 2006: 103) . An acknowledgement of this can make power-sharing solutions such as the one-state proposal and bi-nationalism gain support. For example, Yiftachel and Yacobi (2002) have discussed Jerusalem/al-Quds becoming a shared bi-national city, The material and symbolic dismantling of borders and of negatively constructed differences between people and the consequent recognition of a joint destiny within the same land are very powerful notions. The potential, however, for the creation of new boundaries, tensions and constructions of difference is always present. For Palestinians in
Athens to come to such conclusions involves an understanding of the importance of diversity, tolerance and the multiplicity of situated and dynamic identities, as well as the decoupling of citizenship and national identity within a future Palestinian state or national identity that is constructed in non-exclusive ways. There is more work to be done to explore the repercussions of living in the West on notions of future citizenship and whether this constitutes a form of political transnationalism that has the power to help resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in ways that are not based around exclusivist notions of the relationships between citizenship and national identity but still allow people to belong to a territorialised homeland.
Conclusions
This paper has examined constructions of the relationships between national identity and citizenship in relation to the Palestinian diaspora in Athens. It stresses the need for nuanced and careful understandings of the relationships between those exiled in diaspora and their homeland/host countries, particularly for those who are politicised, stateless or who have ambiguous relations to the state in which they currently live (and which may also be problematic in relation to a future state). As Nagel and Staeheli (2004: 4) stress:
"geographies of community, identity and citizenship are more complex and are in greater flux than much of the contemporary debate [on these issues] implies". This paper has illustrated that due to statelessness and complex legal status Palestinians in Athens have strategically acquired pragmatic citizenship out of necessity, which enables differing forms of belonging that are not necessarily exclusive but that may be constructed and deconstructed for particular politicised and material reasons.
Although notions such as Soysal's (1998) 'post-national membership' and Tambini's 'post-national citizenship' (2001) may be important for those living in diaspora, pragmatic citizenship may be more relevant at times as it takes into account the need to belong to a defined but de/re territorialized nation and/or have multiple attachments and the importance attached to states as the providers of citizenship status.
Above all, it stresses the need for the decoupling of exclusive relationships between citizenship and national identity. The pertinence of nationalism and the institutional constraints imposed by countries (Bailey et al. 2002) and how the lives of those in diaspora are affected as a result must be recognised and cannot be ignored. However, as Fine (1999: 154 ) also reminds us, "nationalism is a fickle beast. In its best moods, it liberates human beings from colonial oppression and unites people previously fragmented but it also excludes those deemed not to belong and demands the active assent of its 'own' nationals". At the same time, despite their potential for exclusivities, it also has to be remembered that national identity and nationalism are malleable, complex and dynamic constructions that are contested through time and space (Armstrong, 1998) .
Those in diaspora, as citizens or not, may be in a difficult position as they realise the importance of cross-border connections and boundary transgressions, but at the same time are limited and hindered by the borders protected and enforced by nation-state institutions who may still try to protect citizenship that is based on potentially exclusive notions of national identity. However, this paper has shown that despite the jus sanguinis nature of Greek citizenship, its acquisition (and potential acquisition) by Palestinians does not necessitate them to feel as if they are fully Greek. Palestinians in Athens are aware of (and utilise) pragmatic citizenship that in turn allows them to construct strong notions of belonging and attachment that may be singular, dual or multiple and that allows them to obtain rights in the host country. Pragmatic citizenship can also lead to inclusive visions of self-determination and future citizenship in a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs live together and where all Palestinians displaced may be included and given the Right to Return. Given the struggles in this part of the world, such perceptions and notions of citizenship as pragmatic that allow for the deconstruction of exclusive relationships between citizenship and national identity are useful for long-term and future scenarios of peace in the region.
